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Hitler’s ‘Middle Eastern Wedge’: Muslim, Indian and Arab Collaboration
“Allah Above Us, and Hitler Beside Us”
“The motto of the newspaper ‘Gazavat’ (“Jihad”) Political organ of the North-Caucasian National-Liberation Movement” (Muñoz, et. al., p. 6)
A Brief History
“Wrong-headed and professionally ambitious, Britain’s men on the spot supposed that Arabs wanted to be ruled by Europeans, and buoyed by this mistaken belief, Kitchener’s lieutenants aimed at taking control of Syria. France’s men on the spot were wrong-headed and ambitious too; and they also aimed to take Syria.” Harkening upon the history of the French knights who had ‘conquered’ a few pieces of territory in the Middle East, many Frenchmen still believed themselves to be entitled to dictate to Syria [Fromkin, p. 94]. Not only were the French aiming at dividing and ruling the ‘spoils’ of the Middle East, but so too were the British [Ibid. 95].
Britain’s aim was to place Lord Kitchener to rule as Britain’s viceroy behind a façade that would appear to be a new Egyptian empire, which would replace the Ottoman Empire [Ibid. 92]. Ronald Storrs was one of the many masterminds behind this divide-and-rule campaign in the region, however he failed to realize that the Moslems—fed up with the ineffectual Young Turk government—would not tolerate Christian-European domination [Ibid. 93]. Moreover, the greatest misperception of all was the British misconception that Moslems were opposed to a Jewish Palestine simply because they believed the Jews to be responsible for the war, when in fact, the conflict between Moslems and Jews had arisen long before the war, “in the wake of Jewish-Zionist colonization at the end of the nineteenth century” [Ibid.]. Yet, in spite of all this tension between East and West, Moslem opinion of Germany remained remarkably high, and the average Moslem—even those in non-Turkish areas—supported a German-Ottoman alliance [Ibid. 92].
World War II
“As far back as 1933, immediately after Hitler’s accession to power, the British-appointed Mufti of Jerusalem, Hāj Amīn al-Husaynī, made contact with the German consul to declare his support and offer his help” [Lewis, p. 348]. This is quite remarkable, however it is also quite comprehesible, as the relationship between Britain and the majority of the Middle East was not a very pleasant one. The Balfour Declaration—materialized into policy in November 1917—was the single greatest strategical blunder on the part of Great Britain, with regard to its Middle East policy, in its history. This declaration established the undefined ‘Home of the Jews’ in Palestine, whereupon following the end of the Second World War, Palestinian Arabs were forcibly driven from their homes in a most rapacious and murderous way at the hands of the Zionist Jews [Ibid.].
After years of struggling with the British and the Jewish influx into Palestine, the Mufti emigrated to Berlin in 1941, in an effort to obtain Germany’s help. Not soon after, Rashīd Alī joined him, as he too fled to Berlin in search of Nazi-Sozi support for Iraq [Ibid. 348-49]. What is quite interesting is the fact that Nāsir expressed his sympathy and disappointment with Germany’s loss after the war. Also, Sādāt’s memoirs indicated that he was a “willing cooperator in German espionage” [Ibid. 349]. Author Lewis attempts to try and argue that this Arab and Middle Eastern enthusiasm for Nazi-Sozi collaboration appears out of place, due to the fact that Germany was almost solely responsible for the mass exodus of Jewry into Palestine. In essence, the historical picture he attempts to paint here is one that would serve to indict Germany—completely and utterly—for the creation of Jewish Palestine, when in fact it was the British who conceived of, legislated, and made possible, Jewish Palestine.
It is true that there was a significant amount of Nazi-Sozi-Jewish collaboration, however let us not forget that Jewry was originally to be deported to Madagascar—as per the Madagascar Plan—as documented and discussed by Göbbels, Hitler, Raeder, Himmler, Frank, Heydrich, and Strechenbach (as well as many others) [Irving, pp. 84, 311-12; Rigg, p. 253; Browning, pp. 56-57, 83, 101, 426]. The beginning of the war—as per the illegitimate Allied entry into this European affair—made the Madgascar Plan completely unfeasible. Hence, naturally acting in its own best interest, Germany did everything in its power to rid itself of Jewry, and Palestine was the only feasible destination, as very few or none of the Allied countries would accept or absorb emigrating Jews.
Moreover, had the Germans won the war, it is more than likely safe to assume that Jewry would have been deported from Palestine—on the wishes of the Arabs and other Moslem populations in the region who had supported Hitler from the beginning—to either far east Russia or Madagascar. So, even though Lewis would prefer to lay blame on Germany, do not forget that Germany was a far greater friend historically to the Middle East than any other Western country, hence, these Mid-East allies were willing to suffer in the short term for the benefits in the long run. Obviously, they did not know that Germany would lose until it was too late to reverse the Jewish exodus into Palestine and the demographic upheaval that ensued.
Also, it was not Germany that continued to support and defend Jews emigrating to Palestine; it was first Britain, and thereafter America. Remember too, that most Arab countries were still opressed under colonial rule, and any possible chance of ending this occupation made Arabs grapple at the first feasible opportunity. Nazi-Sozi Germany was their only forseeable hope.
The primary reason for Arab support for the Nazi-Sozis was more than likely their anti-Jewish agenda [Lewis, p. 349]. The Mufti urged the German government to bomb Tel Aviv, probably in order to inflict a blow unto the Jews, and Jewish organizations urged the governments of London and Washington to bomb the camps of Auschwitz for reasons I am unaware of. Perhaps they wanted to usher in a ‘Holocaust’ against their own people, via mass Allied bombings, in an effort to encourage Gentile sympathy for Jews emigrating to Palestine. Needless to say, all three governments declined to fulfill these wishes, because they did not view them as strategically beneficial for winning the war [Ibid. 351].
Hitler’s Middle Eastern and Arab Collaborators
The Grand Mufti was chosen by General Felmy, head of Special Staff F, and his underlings, because he “could find the words necessary for mobilizing Muslim self-awareness. He and his supporters succeeded in creating significant difficulties for the British Protectorate authorities in Palestine” [Muñoz et. al., p. 20]. On 20 January 1941, the Mufti wrote Hitler asking him for financial, material and moral support in a fight against England. Hitler obliged, and in April 1941, found a means for transporting the material to the Mufti’s armies via an alliance with Rashid Ali Al-Gailani, PM of Iraq. The Iraqi government had requested military assistance and Hitler “emphasized his resolution to enable operations in the Near East by way of military support for Iraq” [Ibid]. In fact, Hitler attached great importance to this alliance, and Rudolf Heβ stated in a conversation with English representatives, “Hitler would not leave Iraq in a fix, so long as it fights on the German side” [Ibid.].
When Aleppo came under English occupation, Major F. Kaukji—organizer of an anti-British revolt in 1936—fled indirectly to Germany. His Arab Legion had been disbanded, however many of its members helped bring the German Abwehr apparatus “up to full strength” [Ibid.].
Unfortunately, Hitler’s assistance could not help Iraq, and on 29 May 1941, the war was over. The government led by Al-Gailani and the Mufti fled to Berlin [Ibid. 22]. With the assistance of these two Arab leaders, the OKW was able to establish close collaboration with Muslim leaders and clerics in “countries of the Arab East.” Their anti-British sentiments were put to good use in this manner. The two Muslim leaders readied an “Iraqi-Arab Army” under the command and leadership of the Wehrmacht. “It was reported to them in Hitler’s name, that in accordance with OKW Directive 30, they could consider the Arab Legion…as the core of a future Iraq-Arabic Army. It was planned to include 1 Syrian, 1 Palestinian/Trans-Jordanian, and 3 Iraqi Divisions” [Ibid.].
On 28 November 1941, Hitler and the Grand Mufti met to discuss formation of an Arab Legion, as well as, the guaranteed independence of Arab countries upon war’s end. Hitler did not wish to see the newfound Arab armies brutally crushed, so he declined the Mufti’s proposed declaration, however, he expressed a desire to create a Legion. The Mufti suggested bringing the Legion up to par by including: 1) Palestinaian Arabs who had fallen prisoner to the Germans 2) Arab officers in need from Iraq, Palestine and Syria 3) Arab POWs from French North Africa 4) North Arican Arab emigrants living in France, and lastly, 5) Arabs from Morocco who had direct ties to the Mufti and who could be trusted. German diplomat F. Grobba suggested that only Iraqi, Syrian, and Palestinian students studying in German-occupied regions serve as officers [Ibid., 22-23].
Soon, tension arose between the Grand Mufti and Al-Gailani, and before long, their relationship ended in open mutual hostility. Hitler supported the Mufti, since Al-Gailani refused to cooperate, and he supported his decision for doing so. “Our ally in that region—the Grand Mufti—besides being a fervent defender of his nation, always proceeds from the real interests of the Arabs, and is never ruled by some ridiculous fantasy” [Ibid.]. Hitler admired the Mufti’s fervent nationalism, but especially his heartfelt honesty when it came to the interests of his people. Hitler saw that he was not the sort of leader who exploited situations for his own personal gain or selfish desires, and this was Hitler’s main reason for giving him his complete support.
Arab-nationalists were recruited under Directive 32, in order to add strength to Staff F. R. Ran was put in charge of recruitment efforts [Ibid. 25]. The recruits eventually included 200 Arabs in Special Staff F, and 20 officers and 200 NCOs and enlisted men in the Brandenburg Division. Sonderverbande No. 288—a battalion which consisted mainly of Germans, but many of whom were Arabs—was deployed in July-August 1942, in order to reinforce Rommel’s Afrika Corps. Several Arab students who had studied in Germany were utilized for sobatage and espionage units and were donned “Death’s Commandos” [Ibid., 25-26].
Sonderverbande No. 287 boasted 2,200 enlisted men and was a completely motorized battalion. This battalion consisted of men among whom 20 different langauges were spoken. They were provided with the most modern weapons and ammunition. In July 1942, “an Arab instructional group of 24 Iraqis, 112 Syrians and Palestinians, and 107 Arabs from the Magreb countries completed special military reconnaissance training” [Ibid. 26]. Special Staff F grew into a Corps-size unit, and by October 1942, contained three motorized battalions, each with 1,000 officers and men; the Third Battalion consisted solely of Arabs “training in Special Staff F’s ‘instructional group’” [Ibid., 27].
“By roster, every battalion was the equivalent of a regiment in weapons and tactics, and firepower potential” [Ibid.]. From the get-go, the Corps numbered 6,000 soldiers, but grew steadily into a larger unit. It added tank battalions, a cavalry regiment, and several other sub-units. Soldiers and officers learned Turkish, Persian, Arabic, and a few other eastern languages. They also knew French and English, and many of the Émigré soldiers of the Near East learned German. In fact, there was so much ethnic diversity among Corps F, that even the Soviet intelligence agents took notice and stated, “many dark-brown people among its soldiers, dissimilar to Germans, speaking in an unknown language.” Corps F moved at night and served bravely as a strike-assault force. Its duties included “intelligence-gathering, diversionary acts, propaganda-agitation tasks, and readying preparations for anti-Soviet revolts in the Caucasus” [Ibid.].
The Iraqi Uprising: The Beginning of Arab Volunteerism
According to Muñoz (2001), “The origins of the Arab volunteer movement in the German Army date back to the failed Iraqi Army uprising of May 1941. Hitler had always expended too little interest on the political currents that moved the Arab world. This explains why German intelligence was inadequately prepared in an area which presented favorable opportunities because of long standing friendly contacts and what appeared to be several similar goals on the part of Nazi Germany and the Arab world” [p. 203]. Indeed, OKW [the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces] was taken aback at these events that had unfurled in Iraq [Ibid.]. The Germans sent aid and support to the Iraqis in May 1941, under the command of Helmuth Felmy and Special Staff F, but because of the Germans’ lack of preparedness, the aid proved to be wholly unable to sustain the Iraqi insurgents [Ibid.].
When the Iraqi uprising was quashed, the Germans elected to keep the staff active in order to establish and maintain better relations with the Arab world on the whole. Muñoz argues that the Germans never acquired a solid policy regarding the Arab world, as their only interest in the region lay with the potential future exploitation of their oil fields. This may well have been the ultimate goal of several Nazis, but it does not appear to have been the goal of Hitler himself. Hitler had already fixed his eyes upon the Russian and Caucasian oil fields.
Hitler’s “United States of the Old World”: Middle East Inclusive
Hitler undoubtedly wanted to open up European trade with the Middle East. He had told Wagener (1985):
“…The Semites seem to recognize their racial compatriots. Furthermore, it seems to me that they understand and know more about race than Europe does. The whitewashed good manners of our continent have seen to it that everything that might contribute to lucidity and truth was overlaid with a coat of uniform gray.
“Let us not lose sight of an alliance with the Arab League. We Germans have gotten into the habit of looking for friends only in Europe—if possible, among people of the same race. Perhaps that’s a mistake. Perhaps it’s much easier to find friends among other races. If the Arabs know that we—that is, a new Germany—can offer them understanding, support, and firm backing in their own struggles for freedom, and that we consider them competent to enter into alliances—welcome them, in fact—such a realization might have significant repercussions on our position in Europe as well. Furthermore, an alliance of interests between Germany and the Arabic-Semitic race might also have far-reaching significance for our relations with the millions of African, Indian, and yellow peoples.
“…I’ll have to sleep on it. It seems to me that it will have to be a long-term goal. Practical politics ties us to England” (pp. 227-228).
“…if Europe is to prevail in the decisive battle with America, it must have the…oil of Russia…it is in the interest of a United States of Europe!...And a Europe that stretches from Gibraltar to the Caucasus includes all the spheres of influence of the countries that belong to it in other parts of the world—especially all of Africa, India, the Malayan archipelago, Australia and New Zealand. Canada will also remain loyal to such a concentration of power, which would otherwise fall to America [which it has]; and the Arabic family of nations will complete the circle of these United States of the old world” (p. 173).
As evidenced in this particular monologue, Hitler clearly did not take a deriding view of the Middle Easterners, or see them as his future oil producers; rather, this was reserved for Russia, and even this presumption is somewhat questionable. Hitler had alluded to such possibilities—that is, the industrialization of the Urals—as recorded in Stanley McClatchie’s Look to Germany (no page numbers). But, he did not actually say that he [even] wanted to “conquer” Russia, let alone sieze her Ural Mountain resources; but, one can be fairly certain that this potentiality had flittered in the back of his mind. There is no doubt that Hitler had great plans, early on, for the Slavs and Arabs, which would have placed them within the newfound “united socialist states,” (Wagener, p. 169). This “old world” bulwark (Ibid., p. 173), in turn, would have served to check America– and Jewry’s growing imperialist hegemony. So, Hitler’s alleged desire to exploit the Arabs, especially as regards their oil reserves, requires qualification.
“Lions of the Desert”: Hitler’s Arabian Volunteers
Special Staff F had no political importance, but, it served as the recruiting vehicle for Arab Wehrmacht volunteers (Muñoz, pp. 203-204). The Arabs joined the Nazis for two primary reasons: 1) they viewed an alliance with Hitler as a possible future means for removing Jews from Palestine—presuming the Nazis won; and 2) they saw an alliance with Hitler as a possible means for attaining self-rule in future, because the French and British would be forced out of the Middle East region (Ibid., 204). Both Al-Hussein [the Grand Mufti] and Al-Gailani [Prime Minster of Iraq] saw an alliance with Hitler as a means of building a future Arabian Army. So, the Arab leaders were uncanny enough to utilize this German-Arab alliance for their own future gains, just as had the German leaders. To attempt to claim that either side “used” the other is moot; alliances are always formed with the interests of both parties, or all parties, in mind. A specially-made arm patch was created for the Arab volunteers; it read, “Free Arabia” [“Freies Arabien” auf Deutsch] (Ibid., pp. 204-205). Instead of providing the Arabs with German colors—black, white, and red—the patch contained the Arabian colors—green, red, black, and white (Ibid., p. 205).
As noted by Muñoz (2001), “The cadre of the German-Arab Training Battalion was established in the town of Sunium, on the southernmost tip of the Greek region of Attica” (Ibid.). A permanent headquarters was established there, and most of the personnel had to live in tents (Ibid.). Training of this battalion started quite promptly. The following passage briefly describes some of the training:
Special Staff F and the Arab volunteers gathered at Sunium in July 1941. Training of the Moslems began almost immediately. The Arabs had a fair knowledge of German and showed themselves willing to learn. Unfortunately, they lacked imagination and this made it difficult for them to understand the significance of the individual phases of a military operation. Quite a number of volunteers could not understand why they should have to go through a toughening up process, although this is an integral part of [European] military training everywhere in the world [take note of the author’s Eurocentric bias here]. The Arab attitude was that it was unnecessary to make a serious effort (Ibid., 206).
Regrettably, many of the German instructors, who had lived in the Middle East, at one time or another, had entered into this training with preconceived notions about the Arabs. They saw them as “menials and shirkers,” which was completely unfair for the volunteers (Ibid.). This demeaning attitude, expressed by these particular Germans, actually had severe repercussions for overall morale (Ibid.). Nevertheless, the Arabs and Germans persevered through these intercultural misgivings.
On 26 January 1942, a certain Captain Schobar took over command of the German-Arab Training Battalion. It was at this point that the Arab volunteers received their unique Moslem arm patches (Ibid., p. 207). The “Arab contingent” had, at this time, 133 members. Several of these volunteers had been former French and British soldiers, but had been captured by the Germans. The volunteers came from such diverse places as “Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Trans-Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, and Iraq” (Ibid.). On 4 August 1942, Sonderverband 287 was established, which contained Arab volunteers and a “German cadre staff” (Ibid., pp. 207-208); this unit had thus also been referred to as the “German-Arab Legion” (Ibid., p. 208). This legion contained a total of three battalions, two of which were motorized, consisting of four companies each; the other was the aforementioned German-Arab Training Battalion (Ibid.). Amongst these Arab companies were: an anti-tank company, an armored car company, a light engineer company, an assault gun battery, a rocket launcher battery [which, it seems, the Arabs have since perfected], and Signals Battalion 287. Africans were enlisted in the North African Arab battalions (Ibid.).
The German-Arab Training Battalion consisted of three Arab companies and, both Arab and German officers. One of these companies contained German soldiers only. According to Muñoz (2001), “The 9th, 10th, and 11th Company were mainly Arab manned, while the 12th (heavy weapons) Company was purely German. The total number of Arabs in the 3rd Battalion was only 392 volunteers. On the whole, Special Staff F had a total of 5,931 officers, NCOs, and enlisted men” (p. 208). Special Staff F became “the 68th Army Corps” on 28 April 1943. “It contained the following Corps troops: 1) Arko 168; 2) Korps—Nachrichten Abteilung 468; 3) Korps—Nachschubtruppen 468; and, 4) Panzer—Spähkompanie 468” (Ibid., pp. 208-209). They found themselves in such diverse regions as: Greece, Slovenia, Hungary, and Serbia (Ibid., p. 209).
Special Staff F was to be deployed to the Caucasus region in the summer of 1942, “with the hope that once the German Army crossed this last mountainous barrier, they would be in a position to strike at British forces in Iraq, Syria, and Iran” (Ibid., p. 211). The Arabs would then be put to the test in the region they knew best—the Middle East. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of Sonderverband 287 were dispatched to southern Russia, specifically, Stalino. Sonderverband 288 was dispatched to North Africa (Ibid.). Sonderstab F made it to Stalino by September 1942. The unit was “redesignated Generalkommando z.b.V.,” and its members were given a special new patch with a tilted swastika, an oval wreath of palm leaves, and rising sun behind a palm tree. The patch was a representation of the specificity of the training program, which was aimed specifically at “desert warfare” (Ibid.). The training emphasized independence and individuality on the battlefield, and called for live fire practice with various pieces of weaponry. Reconnaissance, observation, and compass usage were also emphasized. The Arab language was to only be utilized for everyday phrases and essential military terminology (Ibid.).
When Army Group A found itself trapped in the Caucasus in October 1942, it lost its vital connection with Army Group B in Stalingrad, so, the Germans needed to cover this exposed flank. The order for the employment of 287th Special Purpose Regiment, in the Kalmuck ASSR, arrived 5 October 1942. The Arab battalions still stationed at Stalino were employed as well, and attached to the German 1st Panzer Army. On top of that, Generalkommando z.b.V. was assigned to Army Group A (Ibid.). “The plan was to insert the 287th on the left flank of 1st Panzer Army in the area of Kuma between Niny-Stepnoe and the Manich Canal, where the 16th Motorized Infantry Division’s southern-most mobile defense ended” (Ibid., pp. 211, 213). The 16th Division, which was stationed at the Kalmuck-ASSR capital, was to send out “deep reconnaissance forces in a wide arc.” The Kalmucks assisted the Germans in this specific mission (Ibid., p. 213). The primary points to defend were Acikulak and Urozayne on the Nogayer Steppe, as it turned out; 720 Ukrainian Hilfswilliger (auxiliary forces), also from Stalino, helped out with defense in this instance. Felmy was able to recruit hundreds of auxiliary forces before leaving the USSR (Ibid.).
The 287th Special Purpose Regiment was assigned to the 801st North Caucasian Infantry Battalion, if only temporarily; firstly, to avoid sending these Arab men to their deaths on the treacherous Russian front, for which they were not intended (p. 213), and secondly, to allocate them to helping out with patrol duty in Budenovsk. The 287th was able to assist greatly with repelling a Soviet 4th Calvary Corps thrust (p. 216). Before long, the fierce Russian winter and the utter defeat of the German 6th Army led to the complete withdrawal of the 287th back to North Africa and Tunisia (Ibid.). There, they would be employed to throw back the American forces just arriving in Morocco and Algeria, which were threatening Rommel’s Afrika Corps (Ibid.). In fact, it was the combined efforts of Captain Meyer-Ricks and Captain Schober, in Italy, circa December 1942, that led to a drastic increase in Arab recruitment to the German cause in Tunisia (Ibid.).
Recruitment Greatly Increases
The creation of the Kommando deutsche-arabische Truppen, also known as Kodat, became a very successful endeavor when it came to recruiting Muslim fighters. The DAL, or Deutsche-Arabische Lehr Abteilung, in “Vichy French Tunisia,” was able to acquire hundreds of Muslim-Arabian recruits for the formation of various auxiliary Arab battalions. Vichy France employed these Arabs for the building of fortifications, while the Germans placed their Arab soldiers on coastal, rear area guard, and security duties, which was less hazardous (Ibid.). According to Muñoz (2001), “The ‘Freies Arabien’ arm patch mentioned earlier, was freely distributed” (pp. 216-217). Among these recruits were several men of “obvious Black extraction [read: African].” Muñoz has stated, “…No doubt [this] reminded some of the older German officers of the Black Askari soldiers which served the Kaiser under von Lettow-Vorbeck in German East Africa during the First World War” (p. 217). The presence of the culturally-sensitive arm patch on the German uniforms of these Arab soldiers encouraged others to join. Several new ethnically diverse companies were formed from amongst the Moroccan, Tunisian, and Algerian recruits. Most of these recruits had to make do with French uniforms and “worn-out French rifles,” due to the Allied stranglehold on Axis supply and shipping routes (Ibid.).
It might be pertinent to note, at this point, that the Allies undoubtedly played a direct part in the deaths of millions of internees at German concentration camps, due to their “advance to barbarism,” which included the bombing of warehouses, food storehouses, businesses, railways, and the blockade of supply and shipping routes (The Heretical Press; see also, Johnson, pp. 9-11, 13-29). In fact, the U.S. naval blockade against Japan is what caused Japanese pilots to attack Pearl Harbor. According to Johnson (2006), “…457 British bombers dropped 25,000 stick fire-bombs, 3,540 phosphor bombs [a chemical weapon, of which its usage constitutes a war crime], 129 high explosive bombs, 11 blockbusters and 24 cansiters with phosphoric acid [another chemical weapon used by the so-called “Allies”]. All of these were dropped in [just] one night. 15,000 people were left homeless, approximately 900 houses were totaled and 1,800 were damaged. Three German Chemical Plants at Leuna, Luwigshafen and Zeitz were the targets of a total of 146,000 British and American bombs” (p. 13) [emphasis added]. This sounds a lot like the recent American blitz with uranium-tipped bombs, and white phosphorous, over Iraq (Carter, 2005; Parsons, 2002), and the recent bloodbath campaign waged by the Jewish “dogs of war” over Lebanon (Rappaport, 2006).
According to Muñoz (2001), “There were two types of Arab formations that were raised—those for combat and guard duty and those which were to serve under the supervision of German engineers as construction workers. The Arabs that were to serve as engineers wore a white brassard on the right sleeve of their jacket with the inscription, ‘In Dienste der Deutschen Wehrmacht’ (In the Service of the German Armed Forces). Those who were earmarked for combat battalions wore the ‘Freies Arabien’ arm patch” (p. 220). Between 3,500 and 6,300 Arabs had been recruited by late 1942 (Muñoz, p. 217, 220); 406 Arabs were recruited for service in Vichy France, under Corsican Captain Pierre-Simon Ange Chistofini (Ibid., pp. 217-218). This battalion was known as the “Phalange Africaine” (Ibid., p. 218). On 18 March 1943, the Vichy French Arabs were sworn in under Marshal Petain and they “saw their first action against elements of the British 8th Army” (Ibid., p. 218). The Phalange Africaine later fought against De Gaulle’s “Free French forces” (Ibid.). When De Gaulle’s forces captured 14 of these Arab men, they had them brutally gunned-down for “treason.” The remaining Phalange troops were absorbed into the German DAL on 13 February 1943 (Ibid.). The forces that arose from this included two Tunisian battalions, one Algerian battalion, and one Moroccan battalion. Other Arabs had also served in these battalions, a few of whom were Egyptian, Syrian, Iraqi, Senussi, Taureg, and “other desert Arabs” (Ibid.). The Arab battalions were armed with carbines, light machine guns, some heavy weapons, mortars, and heavy machine guns (Ibid., pp. 218-219). Regrettably, both Meyer-Ricks and Schobar, both fluent in Arabic, were killed by Allied bombers on 24 February 1943; thus, the Arab battalions suffered, with regards to both training and recruiting, as a direct result (Ibid., p. 220). Susequently, the command of Kodat was handed over to Colonel von Hippel, who had formerly been in service in the German African colonies. Colonel von Hippel had previously led the German-Arab Training Battalion in a successful campaign against British commandos at Hammamet. The 287th Special Purpose Regiment was assigned to coastal defense of the “Gulf of Hammamet from Cape Bon to Susa” (Ibid.). In the spring of 1943, these Arabs were able to help the Nazis thwart a British attack on “Captain Fritz von Koenen’s Brandenburg commando unit” (Ibid.). Within 48 hours, the 8 British commandos were caught (Ibid.). At least 80 Arab volunteers had been trained to assist the German 1st Parachute Regiment, “with the hope of using them behind the lines” Otto Skorzeny, Mussolini’s rescuer and one of the greatest commandos of all-time, employed Arab volunteers, too (Ibid., p. 221).
Another Arab unit, the 845th German-Arab Infantry Battalion, was formed in the latter half of May 1943. The battalions of this unit were trained in parachute, basic infantry, and guerilla tactics (Ibid., p. 225). According to Muñoz (2001), “This type of training would later prove to be instrumental in allowing the Arab battalion to operate against the Greek ELAS (Communist) guerillas with great effectiveness. The very nature of the Arab soldier allows for a terrific guerilla fighter—one that is adept at using all of the tricks that other partisan movements employ” (p. 227). The 845th proved to be imperative as regards the capture of Allied agents, including Captain McGregor, who had been assisting the Greek Communists (Ibid., p. 230). Undoubtedly, these intensive Nazi training methods have been perfected by the modern day Arab “insurgents,” and are serving them very, very well. The Arabs of the 845th batallion were described by Captain von Voss as highly resistant to pain, in comparison to Germans, and very brave in the face of death. He had also remarked that they liked to “loot and rape,” as well, which probably did not help the already negative image of the Nazis much. But, unfortunately, male soldiers always rape women in wartime. The Greek Communist Major-General Stefanos Sarafis had described the fight with these Arabs as “fierce,” and he also mentioned that they “burnt houses and raped girls” (Ibid.). The 845th had been tested in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the fall of 1944, and later, between the Danube and Sava Rivers. It was finally absorbed by the 41st Fortress Division (Ibid., p. 234). In March and April 1945, the very last months of the war, the Arabs fought bravely and effectively in both Pommerania and on the Oder marshes. Major Schacht had written, “In at least two instances I owed my life to the Arabs. Their losses were in proportion to their courage” (Ibid., p. 233).
The German-Arab Training Battalion “served as the tactical reserve of an Austrian division, and later with the 999th Light Afrika Division,” and “was employed next to Major Witzig’s parachute battalion” (Ibid., p. 221). On 1 May 1943, this same battalion “relieved a battalion from the Hermann Goering Panzer Division”; on that same day, May 1st, this Arab battalion also repelled an American attack (Ibid.). On May 3rd, the Arabs found themselves performing rearguard duty “for an infantry regiment,” and on the 6th, they became the reserve battalion for a recently-formed Luftwaffe regiment (Ibid.). Remarkably, after the Arab anti-aircraft forces were overrun by the Americans, “the majority of the Arab soldiers in the task force remained with German troops and went voluntarily into captivity with them” (Ibid., pp. 221-222) [emphasis added]. The US war records indicate that about 2,000 Arab men ended up in the Opaluka, Alabama concentration camps, as of 10 April 1946 (Ibid., p. 222). The Britons executed some of these Arab POWs, denouncing them as “Nazi Arabs” in their newspapers, which was clearly a war crime. POW executions are never admissable, but the British murdered them under the auspices of “treason” (Ibid.). So, in other words, if the Germans had won the war, then they could have executed British-Arab volunteers for “treason” without any repercussions; but, since they lost the war, any and all executions they had committed were labeled as “crimes against humanity.” This is just another example of American and British hypocrisy, which is why their current “war on terror” is a gross display of childishness, irresponsibility, and outright bigotry. They can take their “war on terror” and “shove it.”
Fawzi el Kotub: Palestinian-Arabian Commando
Captian Schacht of the German 1st Parachute Regiment was put in charge of the parachute, commando, and sabotage training of at least 80 Arab men. They were trained at the Wittstock Parachute School in Germany. Otto Skorzeny ended up training between “60-75 Italians, 20 Serbians, 15 Frenchmen, and 25 Arabs in the A-Schule (A School) established by the Abwehr in a country estate between the Hague and Schevenningen in Holland” (Ibid., pp. 222-223). This was truly a multi-ethnic commando force. These particular Arab recruits had come from a former “Italian-Arab parachute force” (Ibid., p. 223). Beginning in December 1943, the recruits had to undergo several months of intensive training—including “a W/T course” [I believe this stands for Wireless Telegraphy]. The “technical direction” of the training resided with a “pro-German Dutch engineer. The course was conducted by a German technician from the Havel Institute.” One of these Arab students was a 25-year-old Palestinian follower of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem named Fawzi el Kotub. The Mufti was able to pull some strings, thus obtaining a spot for el Kotub in Skorzeny’s prestigious “sabotage school in Holland” (Ibid.).
The Arab parachute company proved to be successful behind Allied lines in North Africa. Major Witzig’s “exploits” were able to delay US forces. Furthermore, Captain Schacht’s Arab Parachute Company “was used by Witzig’s Parachute Engineer battalion” (Ibid.). In 1945, Major Schacht was able to retain 100 Arabs for the final battle for Berlin. So, it has been confirmed that at least 100 Arabs were willing to give their lives for the defense of the Nazi capital, at a time when Germans were deserting and surrendering by the droves.
El Kotub was put in charge of a four-man team whose mission was combined commando and sabotage operations in Palestine. He refused to perform this assignment and was put in jail for three months before the Mufti arranged for his release. He was then offered a job, in Berlin, preparing Arabic propaganda for the Nazi cause. He was later caught by the Soviet forces in 1945, but “managed to escape by dressing himself up as a wounded German soldier.” He was then captured by the Americans at Salzburg. He was eventually released back to Palestine, where, on 1 February 1948, he was able to bomb the Palestinian Post building. He did this to protest the illegal British occupation of Palestine. Indeed, “His expertise in explosives, learned while serving under the Germans, was finally put to use. He figured slightly in the Arab-Jewish bombings and counter-bombings while the British still held a mandate over Palestine” (Ibid.). There can be little doubt that El Kotub was a predecessor of the modern day Palestinian militia movement against the illegal Jewish-Zionist occupation of Palestine.
Hitler’s Arab Collaboration in Summary
Approximately “500 Syrians, 150-200 Palestinians, 450 Iraqis, 150-200 Lebanese, and perhaps 5-6,000 Moroccans, Tunisians, Algerians, Egyptians, Lybians, and desert Arabs joined the Axis forces between 1941 and 1945.” About 6,000 of these volunteers served directly under the Nazis, while the remaining recruits served “in the forces of Vichy France” (Ibid., p. 236).
As noted by Muñoz, “True political freedom was one right that the Allies were to deny the Arab world, at least until the war was over, and then only grudgingly….For the Arabs, it wasn’t so much what the Nazis had to offer them, as much as what would be destroyed as a result of that Nazi victory” (pp. 237-238). Undoubtedly, a Nazi victory would have spelled the demise of International Jewish-Zionism; and that hope, at least for the Arabs, was worth fighting and dying for.
Hitler’s Lebanese Collaboration
Ahmed Al-Akhdary, a Lebanese man who had traveled to Germany in 1936, was “touched deeply” during his first contact with Hitler. He decided to remain in Germany until 1938, as a result. He gave up his business practice and became a factory worker in Germany. He decided to apply for membership in the Nazi Party, despite his non-German ethnicity, and the owner of the factory for which he worked secured his membership within two days of his request. He was extremely ambitious, as he attended each and every party rally; thus, he made important connections, and eventually secured for himself the position of Nazi Party “official spokesman and representative” at this factory. In 1937, he became friends with the local district’s SS chief, and the two were able to quash a Communist “underground gathering,” for which they received much praise. Together, they formed a 60-man strong militia, and Al-Akhdary—affectionately nicknamed “Dory”—and his men took on “anti-party” Communists in street battles in 1937; one particular 1937 engagement resulted in the deaths of nine militiamen. Dory was injured (Ibid., p. 239). He went back to Lebanon in 1938, in order to recover from his wounds, but missed Nazi Germany so much that he was soon in touch with the Nazi delegate in the Middle East.
Dory organized a small 24-man, pro-Nazi militia in his homeland, and he paid regular secret visits to the German embassy. He and his men were questioned by French troops for distributing leaflets. Dory became worried, contacted the necessary delegates, and secured a ship-ride to Germany. He and his men were employed at the same factory he used to work for, and he promptly re-organized his militia—newcomers inclusive (Ibid., p. 240). Dory attempted to join the German Army, but was rejected, along with his comrades. He then decided to petition the party, offering to serve as a kind of political militia. Dory’s 300-man, multiethnic militia was then trained by a young officer named Schirach. The group consisted of Lebanese, Egyptian, and Syrian volunteers. Dory eventually became the commander of the force.
Once their training was completed, Major Dory and his men were put to the task of recruitment and commando-type operations “behind enemy lines” in Lebanon (Ibid., p. 240). They were given their first mission, which was the destruction of the Palestine-Lebanon-Syria railway. But, this mission was canceled, and they were told instead to “create a popular unrest against the French.” Three of Dory’s men dressed up like French soldiers and attacked the local villagers. The civilians became embroiled; subsequently, they attacked and killed all of the French soldiers on patrol in the area. They also ruthlessly attacked the French HQ. Berlin was pleased, as Dory’s men had quickly set the south aflame; the Germans then sent more arms to Dory. After this successful mission, Dory and his men spent the next five months as German observers. They were then offered with the choice of re-grouping in Germany, or staying; only 27 chose to stay behind. Once Dory and his men got to Berlin, they were dispatched to help out against the Greeks. He was able to capture them, and, he was able to drive the BEF [British Expeditionary Force] out of a nearby village when his men stormed it. After a few exchanges between the BEF and Dory’s forces, the BEF was ultimately forced to surrender (Ibid., p. 241). After this successful campaign, Dory’s men were absorbed into the Afrika Korps. His men served as translators and liason officers. Major Dory was then granted the opportunity to become a “free advisor,” which he accepted.
During one of Rommel’s campaigns, Dory and his 70 men were given three Panzer III tanks, all in need of repair. They utilized these tanks until there was simply no more petrol available. He and his men fought under Rommel’s command until all of them had been killed, injured, or captured. Dory himself was pretty badly wounded, and had to return to Lebanon under the pretense that he had been a “slave laborer for Germany” (Ibid., pp. 242-243). He never saw any of his men ever again and believes that all of them had died (Ibid., p. 243).
Hitler’s Indo-Chinese Collaborators
Heinrich Himmler had actually considered the potential recruitment of North Africans, Senegalese, and Indochinese for his SS and Police forces (Ibid., p. 145). So much for Himmler’s blonde-haired, blue-eyed Supermen, eh? The Germans had captured about 35,000 POWs, from Senegal, North Africa, and Indochina, during their campaign against the French in the summer of 1940. Some 20,000 of these POWs were handed over to the French Vichy government; the French employed them as construction workers and policemen. The Germans wished to appeal to these mens’ “nationalistic tendencies,” so, the SS-Hauptamt hired a professor—who was familiar with the Thai, Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian peoples—to teach them “history.” These history lessons “stressed freedom of the local population from French or British colonial rule.” Germany was portrayed as a fellow fighter against these colonial oppressors.
Most of the Indochinese POWs were put to work in French factories or, were employed as Hiwis (volunteers) “within some of the German occupation divisions in southern France” (Ibid.). Volunteers from Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos were incorporated into “a small infantry force” that was under the ultimate command of the German 19th Army “in southern France.” These Indochinese volunteers had fought on Hitler’s side as late as 21 August 1944, and may well have been used as Hiwis “within the units of the German 19th Army in Colmar” as late as 1945. Regrettably, the SS and Police forces were never able to absorb these Indochinese volunteers, probably due to the dire need for troops as the tide against Germany worsened (Ibid., p. 146).
Hitler’s Indian Collaborators
The German 715th Infantry Division, stationed in southern France, also accepted Muslims into its ranks [Ibid. 29]. The German-Arab Training Division, subordinate to the 5th Panzer Army Headquarters, was created by the Vichy government to defend Tunisia from the Anglo-Americans in 1942 [Ibid., 29-30]. It should be noted too, that an Indian National Legion—Azad Hind—was also formed between December 1941 and January 1942 [Ibid., 30]. This Legion consisted of Hindu POWs who had served for the English, but were taken prisoner during the battle of North Africa. Subhas Chandra Bose also helped with its formation by offering to it his supporters.
On 26 August 1942, the Legion took its Hitler oath of loyalty and was brought in as the 950th Indian Infantry Regiment. It consisted of 2,000 men. Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs served side-by-side in this partially motorized—and partial-cavalry—regiment [Ibid. 30]. The Sikhs were allowed to wear their turbans as “regular field head gear” out of respect for their religious traditions [Ibid., 31]. At the end of 1943, all Muslim Indians were transferred to the SS Handschar Division in Bosnia.
The Handschar Division, which Heinrich Himmler was most excited about, fought all the way from the Netherlands, to southern France, and finally, Germany [Ibid., 31-32]. All along the way, from France to Germany, they came under French Maquis Partisan attacks. In August 1944, the Indian Army Volunteer Legion, SS consisted of 2,300 men—all of whom were volunteers—and was placed under the SS High Command. In May of the fateful year 1945, all of these Legionnaires were captured by the Allies [Ibid., 32].
Conclusion
The authors of The East Came West seem to be of the impression that the Muslim, Arab, and Indian Wehrmacht and SS volunteers were “used” exclusively (by the Germans) as a means to an end [Ibid., 14-15]. Not only do I deem this an absolute and outright insult to these brave men, in the name of true nationalism, but even more importantly, this presumption is very belittling, as to their talents, courage, and sacrifices they all made in WWII.
The authors act as though these particular volunteers were too foolish to understand that they were only of use to the Germans when things got rather ugly during the latter half of the war. However, upon reading about the proactive and nationalistic fervor of the Grand Mufti and Al-Gailani, and more importantly, of the volunteer soldiers themselves, I have come to the conclusion that these men fought for Germany because they saw in this once-in-a-lifetime opportunity a chance to fight for their own idealistic nationalism. Even though they fought under a German flag, this does not mean that they did not feel just as committed to this greater human cause as Germans did. Moreover, this was a chance for them to take advantage of Germany.
German collaboration meant a brighter and more inviting future, imbued with more freedom than these men had seen in a very long time. Suffice it to say, that these men certainly were not “used” by anyone, and their valor and sacrifice will be noted by Western and Eastern posterity alike; a time when the East and West respected one another, died alongside one another, and fought for the very same human ideals.
How Many Served?
Though exact figures are not possible to obtain, the following figures are very close to accurate, and have been documented after much careful and rigorous research.
Between 1941-1945:
· Arabs and Indians of the Muslim faith: approximately 5,000 and 2,000 respectively. · Balkan Muslims: About 30,000 men in 3 SS Divisions; in the Bosnian militia—about 10,000; the Albanian “Balli Kombetar”—about 12,000-15,000; and police units in Kosovo and Metokii—from 14,500-16,500. · In all, roughly 70,000-72,000 men. · Approximately 1,300,000-1, 500,000 Soviet citizens volunteered to fight on Hitler’s side; · 500,000 to 675,000 were volunteers. Of these figures, 400,000 were Muslim, over 25%. · More than 60,000 of these men were Georgians, Armenians, and Kalmyks. · The remaining “Eastern Legions” were composed of: Northern Caucasus—70,000-75,000; Volga Tartars—40,000; Kazakhstan and Central Asia—180,000 men; and Crimean Tartars—15,000-20,000.
All stat information from Muñoz, et. al., The East Came West, [pp. 14-15].
References
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